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his readers take the book on those terms and then perform the Socratic experiment he recommends.

THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE,
1815-1835. By G. Edward White.' New York and London:
Macmillan Publishing Company. 1988. Pp. xxi, 1009. Cloth,
$95.00.
JOHN MARSHALL'S ACHIEVEMENT: LAW, POLITICS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS.
Edited by Thomas C. Shevory.2 Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press. 1989. Pp. x, 232. Cloth, $12.95.
Herman Be/z3

Over two decades ago Robert Faulkner, in The Jurisprudence
of John Marshall (1968), belatedly demolished the progressive interpretation of the "Great Chief Justice" and, it might be argued, prophetically resolved the debate over republican and liberal influences
on the founding fathers and Marshall before it even began. Progressive scholarship had long depicted Marshall as a conservative defender of property rights and national authority who impeded the
progress of democratic states' rights doctrines. In the years after
Faulkner's study, scholarly controversy focused on whether the
founders-and John Marshall as the preeminent expositor of the
constitutional ideas of the founding-were civic-minded virtuous
republicans, or property-minded possessive individualists. Faulkner
viewed Marshall as a liberal or modem republican who wrote the
principles of constitutional democracy into our fundamental law.
Faulkner did not anticipate, however, the controversy over the nature of constitutional interpretation that was to develop and that is
now one of the major issues in Marshall scholarship.
These two books are significant contributions to Marshall historiography. By focusing on the problem of constitutional interpretation, they supplement Faulkner's work. Both books address the
question of republican and liberal tendencies in the thought of Chief
Justice Marshall. White and Shevory also examine Marshall in relation to the issues of judicial activism and public policymaking. In
I.
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the language of contemporary jurisprudence, they ask us to consider whether Marshall was a restraint-minded interpretivist or an
activist-minded, quasi-legislative noninterpretivist. 4
A volume in the Oliver Wendell Homes Devise History of the
Supreme Court, White's book is a monumental work in the sense
defined by that series. He begins by discussing the cultural and
legal sources of Marshall Court jurisprudence, the working life of
the Court, prominent lawyers who appeared before it, and the
Justices and reporters. There follow chapters on admiralty jurisdiction; sovereignty and Union; property, vested rights, and the contract clause cases; cases involving slaves and Indians;
nonconstitutional cases dealing with real property, contracts, federal court jurisdiction and procedure, and international law; and a
concluding discussion of the theories of law and history that influenced constitutional adjudication in the early nineteenth century.
Demonstrating impressive historical and legal erudition, White covers these topics while pursuing three principal interpretive themes:
the adaption of republican ideology to cultural change, the nature
of the Union, and the scope of judicial discretion and policymaking
under Marshall's leadership.
I

In his discussion of republicanism, White employs the concept
of ideology as a cultural system which provides the matrix and determines the structure and content of the thought of an age. He
argues that the United States was a republican society that lacked a
historicist theory of cultural change and faced the prospect of inevitable decay. Yet Americans believed they could break the cycle of
decay that had afflicted all previous societies by "recasting" revolutionary first principles, thereby making possible the perpetuation
and perfection of their exceptional ideas and institutions. One way
to do this was through judicial interpretation of the Constitution
and the common law.
According to White, recasting of the nation's defining principles was necessary because cultural changes were occurring, intro4. Recent works which address this issue include C. WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN
JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW
(1986) (arguing that Marshall was an interpretivist who generally applied the principles of
the Constitution according to the framers' intent); Snowiss, From Fundamental Law to
Supreme Law of the Land: A Reinterpretation of the Origins of Judicial Review, 2 STUDIES IN
AM. PoL DEVELOPMENT 1-67 (1987) (arguing that Marshall was decisive in the shift to
legalistic, text-based judicial review that paved the way for policymaking judicial activism);
L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION (1988) (arguing that Marshall was the first and greatest judicial activist in Supreme Court history).
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ducing what would later be called "liberal" social, economic, and
political practices and institutions. The means by which judicial
recasting of fundamental principles in the areas of constitutional
and common law took place was through the use of "consensual
surrogates." This is White's shorthand term for concepts such as
property, commerce, and Union that were sufficiently broad and
amorphous to reconcile tensions resulting from the conflict between
republicanism and emergent liberalism. The republican principles
that the Marshall Court in particular recast or restated included
representative government, property rights, commerce, liberty, virtue, divided sovereignty, distrust of partisanship, and suspicion of
mass democracy.
White's treatment of republicanism and liberalism in the revolutionary period conforms to current historiographical orthodoxy.
He regards republicanism as the ideology of the Revolution which
encountered-and accommodated-the ideology of liberalism in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. His account of the
legal manifestations of this cultural-ideological conflict, as seen in
judicial decisions involving real property, contracts, and negotiable
instruments, also reflects the viewpoint of the law and economics
school of legal history.
White's interpretation of these matters is informative and unproblematic except for one basic issue. Like the historians of the
republican synthesis whom he follows, White erroneously views the
ideology of the Revolution as classical republicanism. In fact the
ideology was that of modern or liberal republicanism which accepted liberty, individual natural rights, and market exchange, despite the contradiction between these and the classical concept of
virtue.s
Two essays in John Marshall's Achievement are pertinent in
this connection. In "John Marshall as Republican: Order and
Conflict in American Political History," Thomas C. Shevory, while
accepting Faulkner's view of Marshall as essentially a Lockean liberal, calls attention to allegedly classical republican elements in his
political outlook. Focusing on his historical writings, Shevory says
that Marshall viewed the Constitution as an antidemocratic force
that prevented the popular will from threatening the virtuous order.
Like White, Shevory writes under the misapprehension that American republicanism was authentically classical in nature.
Richard A. Brisbin, in "John Marshall on History, Virtue, and
Legality," provides a more satisfactory analysis of the republican5. See T. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT Of MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION
OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LocKE ( 1988).
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ism of the Founding, which he recognizes as possessing distinctly
liberal characteristics. Brisbin argues that despite the acceptance of
the classical republican paradigm in colonial political culture, a liberal democratic political organization took shape in the united colonies from the outset of the revolutionary era in 1765. The reason
was that the emergent polity was too large for classical republican
forms. The purpose of liberal republican government, and the role
of law in such a regime, was to regulate interests rather than express
community morality and educate citizens in public virtue. Brisbin
points out that Marshall as a liberal republican approved of commerce as a civilizing and virtuous force as well as a source of national power to defend liberty and a means of distributing economic
power in the society. More clearly than White, Brisbin describes
the convergence of liberal self-interest and republican civic virtue in
the development of private commercial virtues that had public
ramifications.
II

Unionism offers a second interpretive focus for studying the
Marshall Court. White views Marshall as a proponent of the popular sovereignty theory of the creation of the Constitution and the
Union, in contrast to the compact theory of the Union asserted by
states' rights advocates. White presents Marshall not simply as a
nationalist, however, but as a "consolidationist" whose decisions on
the nature of the Union vindicated the worst fears of the Virginia
Republican states' rights coterie.
According to White, the instrument of Marshallian consolidation was the coterminous power theory, which held that federal
legislative and judicial powers were coextensive. The theory of coterminous power also regarded the three branches of federal government as sharing an identity of interest that caused them to act with
unity in a partisan or policymaking sense. Employed by the Antifederalists in their analysis of the Constitution during the ratification controversy, coterminous power theory was a principal doctrinal basis of Republican opposition to Federalist judges' exercise of a
federal criminal common law jurisdiction in the 1790s.
The Jeffersonian Republicans' imputation of consolidationist
or centralizing ambitions to the Federalists in the party struggles of
the early national period is familiar. What distinguishes White's
account of this matter is his argument that the states' rights men
were correct in their belief that the Federalist party and the
Supreme Court under John Marshall really did aim at consolidating
authority in the national government through the use of cotermi-
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nous power theory. White contends that the theory of coterminous
power was a "political axiom" recognized by both Federalists and
Republicans as inherent in the nature of government. He proceeds
to explicate the Marshall Court's national sovereignty decisionsMartin, McCulloch, Cohens, and Osborn-as significant mainly for
their assertion of coterminous power theory. In a subsequent article, White has elaborated his argument that this coterminous power
theory explains some of the fears of the states' rights men.6
This thesis raises several questions. White states that the Marshall Court's acceptance of the coterminous power theory presented
the prospect of unlimited federal jurisdiction and sovereignty.
White thus seriously qualifies, if he does not wholly reject, the generally accepted view that although John Marshall insisted on national supremacy with respect to the ends or objects for which the
federal government was created, he approved the principle of
divided sovereignty and hence was not a consolidationist. White
observes that Marshall's nationalism was not interventionist, legislative, or proto-regulatory in a twentieth century liberal reform
sense. Marshall did not use coterminous power theory to make the
Union an omnipresent force or take an expansive view of the functions of the federal government. On the contrary, White says that
the Court under Marshall used the doctrine of coterminous power
defensively to preserve indispensable federal powers and protect the
Union against centrifugal attacks. From a nationalist standpoint,
the Court's espousal of the doctrine produced modest or negligible
policy results. White shows, furthermore, that starting with Houston v. Moore (1820), a jurisdictional case involving the power of
Congress over the state militia, the Court fashioned the doctrine of
concurrent sovereignty and retreated from coterminous power theory out of deference to rising states' rights sentiment.
The question arises, then, what is the historical significance of
the coterminous power theory that figures so prominently in
White's account? His treatment of this issue is not intended to illuminate the twentieth century problem of bureaucratic regulation as
a threat to limited government and the federal-state balance. Nor
does White interpret the nationalism of the Marshall Court as a
direct threat to the slavery interest, the fear that was most immediately disturbing to Marshall's states' rights critics. Rather, in
White's analysis coterminous power theory is historically relevant
to the rise of modern judicial review. The doctrine of coterminous
power, pressed to its logical conclusion, became in Marshall's opinions a rationale for judicial discretion. "The great significance of
6.

White, Recovering Coterminous Power Theory, 14

NOVA L. REV.

155 (1989).
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coterminous power theory in the Court's decisions," White declares, "was as a rationale for unlimited federal judicial power .... "

III
In The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, as in his other
writings, White deals centrally with the nature of law and the relationship between law and politics. Can law properly be reduced to
political partisanship, expediency, interest or ideology? Or does it
consist of objective principles and rules that possess intrinsic validity? In the early nineteenth century, White argues, this issue assumed the form of the problem of judicial discretion. It was the
question of judicial discretion, he observes, and "the related problem of distinguishing the judicial declaration of legal principles
from partisan political activity" that was "foremost in the minds of
Marshall and his contemporaries."
As a historian, White seeks to understand the Justices of the
Marshall Court through their own eyes, as they understood themselves. "Reconstructing the jurisprudential universe of the Marshall Court," he notes, "requires abandoning several of the premises
governing modern analyses of the Court's actions." A basic assumption of early nineteenth century jurisprudence was that legal
decisions and doctrines are not political or ideological in nature. As
a modern scholar, however, White assumes "that the formation of
legal doctrine can ... be read as an ideological exercise." A major
methodological problem thus appears: "How does one assess the
ideological posture of a court whose members try to conceal their
belief structures and to suggest that their judgments have nothing to
do with ideology?" The answer to this problem is that the critical
historian must take what Supreme Court judges say about the nature of judicial decisionmaking at a discount, and White does this.
Yet fair-minded scholar that he is, he is able to overcome modern
prejudices and assumptions to the extent necessary to present early
nineteenth century ideas about law, adjudication, and judicial discretion as worthy of respectful consideration. Indeed, White even
concedes that the concept of neutral legal principles and legal as
opposed to political discretion may be essential to the rule of law.
These issues warrant more detailed consideration.
In addition to consolidation, supporters of states' rights in the
early nineteenth century feared judicial discretion. Discretion referred to the opportunities for federal judges to make partisan decisions or unwritten decisions without having to account for their
actions. When federal decisions usurped the prerogatives of state
courts or legislatures, judicial discretion had consolidationist effects.
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Attacked by states' rights critics for exceeding the limits of judicial
power, Marshall and Justice Joseph Story countered with the argument that the Justices exercised "mere legal discretion," consisting
only of finding and declaring appropriate legal authorities and applying the language and spirit of the Constitution. In practice, the
problem of judicial discretion arose most frequently with respect to
two matters: the determination of jurisdiction and the declaration
of substantive rules. Justices of the Supreme Court believed a court
could properly find and declare substantive rules drawn from several sources--the Constitution, the common law, the law of nature
or of nations, the civil law, equity, the law merchant, admiralty and
maritime law, federal and state statutes. A court then applied the
rules to a case where it had jurisdiction. In doing so the court did
not, in the view of early nineteenth century jurists, engage in law
making. According to Justice Story, once jurisdiction had been
granted by the national legislature to a court, the power to determine the nature and extent of that jurisdiction was part of the
court's substantive rule making authority.
How can a limited theory of federal jurisdiction, White asks, be
reconciled with an open-ended conception of the nature and sources
of the law? Believing such a reconciliation to be impossible, he concludes that the Supreme Court's "mere legal discretion" was really
a broad political discretion that allowed the judiciary to make policy as a partisan political body. The Court was careful, however, to
avoid being perceived as a partisan agency. At the same time, White
explains, the Marshall Court blurred the distinction between law
and politics by adhering to a conception of the Constitution as embracing politics and political theory. In Cohens v. Virginia, for
example, Marshall employed a political conception of the Constitution. A principle of law-the supremacy of the Union- was embodied in the Constitution, yet the principle was also one of politics.
Moreover, in the event of a conflict between a state and the national
government, the arbiter was assumed to be the Supreme Court.
White states that under this theory of a political Constitution it was
hard to know how the federal judiciary would be limited in its constitutional interpretations except by politics. He goes on to elaborate a view of Marshall as a judicial activist who professed to invoke
the will of the law, while in fact enforcing the "will of the Court."
In White's account, the Marshall Court's approach to constitutional interpretation forms another dimension of its judicial activism. In the Dartmouth College case, for example, the Court did not
interpret the contract clause in accordance with the intent of the
framers. White says the Court "reconstituted" the contract clause,
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"packing" it with extra-constitutional arguments such as the takings and vested rights concepts. Fusing "general principles" with
specific constitutional language, Marshall adhered to the constitutional text while giving the words an ideological meaning. To use
the terms currently in vogue, the Court employed a noninterpretivist rather than an interpretivist method of constitutional adjudication. In other cases, such as Gibbons v. Ogden, White similarly
sees the Court "recasting" the commerce power and providing a
"restatement of first principles." In nonconstitutional or common
law cases, where the Justices were not bound by a text, the limits on
judicial discretion were even less visible and the scope of judicial
activism all the greater.
The Supreme Court fostered the impression, White contends,
that its decisions were above politics, embodied the will of the law,
and involved mere legal discretion. In White's opinion, however,
the fact that the Court chose among competing doctrines that had
political implications proves that the Justices failed to separate law
from politics. Their attempt to distinguish law from politics and
their rejection of overt partisanship were tactical moves in a strategy aimed at securing the legitimacy of their decisions. Although
some jurists and commentators saw through this maneuver and criticized the Court's policymaking discretion, White says the strategy
was regarded as a respectable intellectual proposition by the Court's
contemporaries. Acceptance of the idea that judicial decisions were
not discretionary in the strict partisan sense, White observes, was
not confined to defenders of the Marshall Court.
Implicit in The Marshall Court and Cultural Change is the thesis that the distinction between law and politics assumed in declaratory jurisprudence is a basic feature of American constitutionalism.
In a recent article, White asserts that American culture has made a
profound investment in the ideal of the rule of law as a body of
neutral principles administered by disinterested judges. Arguments
advanced by judges in support of this ideal, he writes, are "excusable." We may even believe, he continues, that such arguments "are
ultimately necessary in a culture in which the rule of law ideal is
deeply embedded and in which trust and justice are elusive goals."7
But since the separation of law and politics is only a myth, says
White, it is naive for a commentator or historian to subscribe to it.
He adds that jurisprudential axioms, reflecting the prevailing culture and ideology, are no more permanent than the judges who declare them.
7.

White, supra note 6, at 194.
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IV
In The American Judicial Tradition (1976), White depicted
Marshall as the founder and preeminent exemplar of a method of
constitutional decisionmaking that "retained an oracular style but
grounded decisions on appeals to the first principles of American
civilization."
In that book, while recognizing the political importance of
Marshall's decisions,s White basically viewed the great Chief Justice
as an interpretivist and a source of the tradition of judicial restraint
in American jurisprudence. In his most recent work, however,
White emphasizes Marshall's activist and noninterpretivist tendencies. He now contends that Marshall "recast" the framers' first
principles and "packed" the text of the Constitution. Moreover,
White deems it paradoxical that legal observers in the early nineteenth century could grasp the fact that particular Supreme Court
decisions were political without the benefit of the modem theory
which regards courts as inevitably political and policymaking
bodies.
White thus appears to have moved closer to a legal realist or
positivist view of the constitutional order and the process of constitutional adjudication. Yet he is unwilling to embrace this outlook
in a clear and straightforward manner. Ambivalence appears, for
one thing, in the full and fair-minded description of the declaratory
theory of law that White presents. His detailed and faithfully rendered historical exposition raises the question of whether the Marshallian theory of legal discretion and the distinction between law
and politics might be valid in some enduring sense, rather than
merely strategic, functional, pragmatic and reflective of the ideology
and culture of the time. Notwithstanding the modernist assumptions that lead him to emphasize Marshall's activism, White
prompts us to ask whether not only jurists, but scholars and commentators as well might be justified on historical and philosophical
grounds in describing the declaratory theory of law as consisting of
legal axioms that define any genuine or legitimate legal order.
White has elsewhere observed that modernist epistemology,
the dominant intellectual orthodoxy since the New Deal, is under
attack. The term "modernism" here refers to the idea of an unstable and unpredictable universe in which human beings must be satisfied with only partial and transient knowledge, and a priori value
8. For example, White wrote: "In Marshall's hands the judiciary, ... allegedly deciding legal, not political questions, . . . became a political force comparable in stature to the
other branches of government." THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADmON: PROFILES OF
LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 33 (1988).
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systems are believed to be illusory. Legal realism rested on modernist assumptions; it promoted a relativistic, experimental, and pragmatic approach to legal and constitutional problems. According to
White, this outlook is now questioned and there is widespread
searching for a stable reference point from which to ground the primacy of substantive values.9
Neither by precept nor by example does The Marshall Court
and Cultural Change cast light on what White has called "our current epistemological predicament," or indicate a way out of it. to On
the contrary, White avoids the question of the existence of a stable
reference point for substantive values by seeking refuge in historicism. The historicist assumptions of the book are most plainly apparent in the contention that the jurisprudential views of the early
nineteenth century were not those of the late twentieth century, and
that the Supreme Court accordingly was a completely different institution. White states that it was "a Court of a different century,
with a character fundamentally different from its modern counterpart." Emphasizing "the uniqueness, the 'differences,' and the
time-boundedness" of the Marshall Court, he says it is anachronistic for moderns to criticize the Justices of the early nineteenth century for their political interventions, conflicts of interest, and
judicial arrogations of power, all of which stemmed from radically
different conceptions of law and judging. From this perspective, no
judgment can be made about the validity of different theories of law.
The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that the legal order
in each age operates on theories and assumptions that reflect the
dominant culture and ideology.
White's radical historicism is unsatisfactory for several reasons. In the first place, there would be no point in studying early
nineteenth century judicial history if the Supreme Court and the
constitutional system of that time were as different from the late
twentieth century Court and Constitution as he contends. In fact
there are strong elements of institutional and theoretical continuity
in the constitutional order that infuse constitutional history with
practical importance. White recognizes this in a recent article in
which he reflects on some of the themes in The Marshall Court and
Cultural Change. He asserts, for example, that although the issue
of consolidation raised by coterminous power theory may not be
pertinent today, the issue of judicial discretion is less "time-bound."
The history of judicial discretion is relevant, in other words, because judicial review not only exists today, but plays an even more
9.
10.

White, Recapturing New Deal Lawyers, 102
/d.

HARV. L. REV.

499, 510 (1988).
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significant role in American government. White notes further that
the Marshallian concept of judicial discretion lasted until the early
twentieth century, and comments that we may be closer to the
world of the framers than we think. 11 The implication is that we
live under the same Constitution as the founders, and that the ideas
and actions of that era are not time-bound but are pertinent to contemporary constitutional problems.
There is, to use White's term, other "unfinished business" on
the constitutional agenda that leads me to reject his thesis of radical
discontinuity between the Marshall Court and the Court in our
time. A major issue for Americans in the early nineteenth century
was whether the principles of the Revolution could be preserved.
Law was a way of maintaining the nation's first principles in the
face of cultural change and preserving republican government. The
role of the judiciary was to reconcile republicanism with cultural
change, and in order for the courts to accomplish this purpose it
was necessary for them to have legal as opposed to political discretion. This discretion, however, was potentially political and tyrannical. Therefore it needed to be depoliticized, made cognizant of
the limitations of federal sovereignty, and based on reason that was
compatible with republican values.
Are not the same issues present in our time? Is there not need
today of the same distinction between law and politics in order to
limit the political and policymaking discretion of the courts and
prevent government by a will independent of the society, a danger
warned against by Madison in Federalist No. 51? Although he apparently does not intend to, White shows through his historical exposition how the Marshall Court dealt with issues that, far from
being unique, were inherent in American constitutionalism: the
role of the judiciary in a republican government, the nature of sovereignty in a federal system, and the protection of property rights
against government encroachment. His radical historicism notwithstanding, White makes clear the continuing relevance of the theory
of legal discretion, the idea of law as embodying neutral principles
based on reason for the common good, and the idea of the Constitution as comprising fundamental political principles rather than simply a legal text to be interpreted according to the techniques of legal
positivism.
In conclusion, we may consider Michael Zuckert's essay,
"Epistemology and Hermeneutics in the Constitutional Jurisprudence of John Marshall," in the Shevory volume. Zuckert explicates and seeks to recover the political conception of the
II.

White, supra note 6, at 193.
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Constitution as the embodiment of fundamental principles, not
merely a time-bound reflection of the founding period, as White
suggests. Zuckert identifies Marshall as an interpretivist, rejecting
the theory that he was a political judge and an activist. According
to Zuckert, Marshall interpreted the text in the light of an overall
conception of the nature and purpose of the Constitution, which
Zuckert refers to as the "pantext." This is the key to Marshall's
jurisprudence.
In an analysis that in many respects parallels Sylvia Snowiss's
interpretation of the origins of judicial review, Zuckert explains
how political and legalistic concepts of the Constitution were combined in the framing of the document, and in the exercise of judicial
power by Marshall. Furthermore, the trend of constitutional development was toward a more legalistic instrument of government, as
seen in the addition of the Bill of Rights, the rise of judicial review,
and the eventual adoption of the Reconstruction amendments.
Nevertheless, Zuckert argues, these legalistic elements were grafted
onto a Constitution that "in chief inspiration and dominant character remained political."
Unlike White, whose historicist assumptions cut him off from
the founding and align him ultimately with noninterpretive realism
and positivism, Zuckert holds out the possibility of recovering the
political dimension of the Constitution intended by the framers.
Other scholars raise the same issue.12 Their purpose, like Zuckert's,
is to restore both limited constitutional government and republican
self-government. If the goal of such a constitutional renewal is not
good government in the sense of classical virtue, it is nevertheless a
better government than that which can be provided by judges exercising a will independent of the society. For guidance in this project, we do well to reflect on the jurisprudence of John Marshall and
the history of the Marshall Court.
12. See. e.g., Kristol, They Disdain to Conceal Their Views and Aims: The New Candor
in the Law Schools, I BENCHMARK 13 (1984); Bryden, Politics, the Constitution, and the New
Formalism, 3 CONST. COMM. 415 (1986); Nagel, Interpretation and Imponance in Constitutional Law: A Re-Assessment of Judicial Restraint, 25 NOMOS 181 (1983).

